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ABSTRACT: 
 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) initially designed to ensure maritime security through continuous position reports has 
been progressively used for many extended objectives. In particular it supports a global monitoring of the maritime domain for 
various purposes like safety and security but also traffic management, logistics or protection of strategic areas, etc. In this 
monitoring, data errors, misuse, irregular behaviours at sea, malfeasance mechanisms and bad navigation practices have inevitably 
emerged either by inattentiveness or voluntary actions in order to circumvent, alter or exploit such a system in the interests of 
offenders. This paper introduces the AIS system and presents vulnerabilities and data quality assessment for decision making in 
maritime situational awareness cases. The principles of a novel methodological approach for modelling, analysing and detecting 
these data errors and falsification are introduced. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although being a place full of wildlife richness, the sea is also a 
major place for human activities. As a matter of fact, many 
human activities, such as fishing, transportation of goods, 
cruising and sailing take place at sea, all having an impact, more 
or less important, on the worldwide economy. All around the 
world, fishing activities enable millions of fishermen to live 
from this activity, goods transportation by sea represent 90% of 
total goods transportation and cruising generates more than 315 
thousands jobs in Europe as of 2013, for a global number of 
more than 20 million passengers (MEDDE, 2014). The sea is an 
important place for energy transportation, with for instance gas 
tankers, the importance of which being ever increasing (Napoli, 
2014). The ever increasing maritime traffic (MEDDE, 2014) 
leads to more and more crowded areas. The risks in coastal 
areas near the harbors are numerous, as it is a place where an 
important amount of vessels are gathered, each one of them 
trying to optimize its trajectory, leading to conflicting 
behaviors.  
 
Rules were put in place in order to prevent collisions at sea, 
which endanger the crews, can be hazardous for the 
environment (e.g. in case of oil spill), for the local economy and 
lead to important earnings and money losses for the involved 
people or companies. 
 
Surveillance systems were also put in place by the states willing 
to improve safety and security at sea off their coasts, and 
identify hazardous areas and suspicious ships, which could have 
illegal interests. One of them is the AIS system, which uses 
VHF radio frequency to transmit messages to other fitted out 
vessels and shore-based stations. It is then possible to gather all 
those real-time positions, which is done by the authorities 
(harbors, Vessel Traffic Services) or Internet dedicated website 
(such as marinetraffic.com). 
 
Although the different surveillance systems are meant to be 
complementary, the AIS system has a wider range of detection 
than radar, and enables to get rid of the potential masks due to 
the land in coastal areas. However, it is a system based on 
signals sent by a device on board the vessel, the use of it being 
at the crew’s discretion. The messages sent can be falsified, the 
signal can be spoofed and errors can be committed during the 
filling in of some information in the system. A mathematical 
processing of data could bring information on the reliability and 
integrity of data by providing a messages-based coefficient by 
methods inspired by the Information Theory. Such a coefficient 
would rate information. People in Vessel Traffic Services 
(VTSs) and on-board vessels can be led to take decision on the 
basis on available information they have. The knowledge of the 
quality of information they handle is of paramount importance 
in the situational awareness in which the decisions are taken. 
This article presents a contextualization of AIS falsifications 
and the methodological approach in the scope of the assessment 
of the quality of data, however, quantitative assessment of data, 
data quality standards and results of any implementation are not 
the purpose of this paper. 
 
2. THE AIS SYSTEM 
2.1 The genesis of the system 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) was put in place by 
the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) convention, in its 2002 
version (IMO, 2004). This convention, initiated in 1914 by the 
sinking of the RMS Titanic two years beforehand, has the 
purpose of defining the minimal requirements to which every 
vessel from signatory countries should comply with. The 
SOLAS convention deals with a lot of subjects, ranging from 
the construction of vessels to the way radio-communications 
shall be done. One of those subjects is the security and safety of 
 maritime navigation, and the AIS system was created in this 
scope, in order to provide real-time spatiotemporal positioning 
to the vessels. 
 
2.2 The concerned vessels 
All the vessels from the signatory states are not concerned with 
this system. Indeed, the SOLAS convention, in its fifth chapter, 
nineteenth rule, paragraph 2.4, states that “All ships of 300 
gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages 
and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged 
on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of 
size shall be fitted with an automatic identification system” 
(IMO, 2004). The deadline for setting up the system on-board 
ships depends on the ship itself: from the 1st of July 2002 for 
new ships and ships engaged in international voyages at the 
soonest to the 1st of July 2008 for some ships not engaged in 
international voyages at the latest.   
 
2.3 The transmission mode of AIS 
The AIS messages use the Very High Frequency (VHF) 
bandwidth, especially the dedicated Marine VHF bandwidth (4 
distinct bandwidths for a total range of 2.225MHz). Two 
worldwide wavelengths are dedicated to the transmission of AIS 
messages: 161.975MHz and 162.025MHz. In order to transmit 
and receive signals, dedicated devices have been built since the 
introduction of this system. Four kinds of devices can be 
distinguished: 
- Class A transponders: they equip the vessels for which the 
use of AIS is compulsory. They can emit and receive 
simultaneously on both channels. 
- Class B transponders: in general, they equip the vessels for 
which the use of AIS is not mandatory but which want to 
be equipped. 
- Multi-channel receivers: those devices can only receive 
messages, on both channels simultaneously. 
- Radio scanner receivers: those devices can only receive 
messages, switching from one channel to the other one 
when wanted. 
Two kinds of transmission are possible: terrestrial, and by 
satellite. At first, the system was intended to be only terrestrial, 
for transmission from one vessel to another or between a vessel 
and a coastal beacon, in a range of distance limited by the 
curvature of the Earth (up to circa 40 nautical miles in the best 
conditions (NASA, 2012)). Then, the development of ad hoc 
satellites enabled the harnessing of the signal even far from the 
coast line. The satellite uploads and stores up the received 
messages then downloads all the stored messages when it meets 
a coastal beacon. In the last years, with the development of the 
Internet, such data can be displayed in almost real-time on 
dedicated websites, and led to the knowledge of behaviors at 
sea. Where formerly ships literally disappeared beyond the 
skyline, they can now be tracked all around the world by every 
person having an Internet access. 
 
2.4 The different kinds of messages 
The SOLAS convention, in its fifth chapter, nineteenth rule, 
paragraph 2.4, states that AIS shall “provide automatically to 
appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft 
information, including the ship’s identity, type, position, course, 
speed, navigational status and other safety-related information”, 
“receive automatically such information from similarly fitted 
ships”, “monitor and track ships” and “exchange data with 
shore-based stations” (IMO, 2004). As the communications can 
be various, it was necessary to create several messages, the 
pattern of each one of which being suitable to a particular 
situation. There are 27 messages in total, the most used being 
the numbers 1, 3 and 5 (Tunaley, 2013), used by class A 
transponders for spatiotemporal position reports, respectively 
scheduled, special and static. Some messages are standard 
(spatiotemporal position reports for class A, B, aircrafts and 
satellite transmission), some are for the aid to navigation 
(number 21), some are for timing request, others for safety 
purposes. The lengths of the messages differ: from one to five 
time slots (Tunaley, 2013). The standard messages used for 
terrestrial transmission is longer than satellite AIS transmission, 
for data storage purposes. Even if most of information is about 
ships, some aircrafts are also fitted out with AIS, and some 
problems AIS meets also impact Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system (Faragher et al., 2014), 
a surveillance technology for aircrafts. 
 
In a standard position report of class A transponder, the 
geographical information in the messages is sent every 2 to 12 
seconds when the vessel moves (depending on the speed of the 
vessel, the higher the speed, the closer the messages). When the 
ship is anchored, the messages are sent only every three minutes 
(Redoutey et al., 2008). In a mean day, 400 000 messages are 
sent from more than 22 000 vessels (NASA, 2012). The main 
data given in the message are (ITU, 2014): 
- The number of the message 
- A unique identification number of the user 
- The navigational status 
- The turning rate 
- The speed 
- The longitude 
- The latitude 
- The course 
- The true heading 
- The time 
- The communication of the date of the next message 
2.5 How the data flow is handled 
As formerly stated, an AIS message includes the time of the 
next communication. This means that the system is self-
governing for the attribution of the time slots. The system 
selects an empty slot in which it wants to communicate, it 
chooses it on the basis of the previously received messages in 
order to prevent to use an already booked slot and prevents all 
others ships from using the slot it books for its next 
communication (ITU, 2014). This protocol is call SOTDMA, 
which stands for Self Organized Time Division Multiple 
Access, and it is especially designed for communication 
networks at sea. In case of conflict (when a meeting with a new 
station which has booked the same slot), the stations can modify 
their own allocations. Other protocols exist, for class B 
transponders and some messages having priority. 
 
 2.6 The uses of AIS 
The system has several uses, albeit initially designed for safety 
and security purposes, some people use the system another way.  
The AIS can be used for the prevention of boarding (alarm 
triggering when a small closest point of approach is computed), 
investigation in case of accident, control of fishing fleets, cargo 
fleets, global traffic, traffic in specific hazardous areas, maritime 
safety (for a state), aid to navigation or search and rescue 
operations. 
3. A VULNERABLE SYSTEM 
3.1 A system for decision making 
As stated before, the AIS system is used for decision making in 
maritime situations, on-board or ashore. Those decisions can be 
important as they can bring into consideration up to the lives of 
crew members and the wholesomeness of the environment. 
However, the AIS system is characterized by its neither 
authenticated nor encrypted nature. A part of the information 
(the static information, the one which does not evolve with 
time, such as the name of the ship or its length) is entered 
manually at the initialization of the device, and this information 
is not controlled by any authority. Moreover, some dynamic 
information is provided continuously by the GNSS antenna 
paired up with the AIS device. It is the combination of all this 
information that would help the user in making a decision. 
 
As it is not possible to assess if the data is true, a big issue of 
data quality is arisen. As the AIS is a self-supplying system, 
some actors could want to put into the system deliberately 
erroneous data in order to hide their activities. Other actors 
could make unintentional errors when they fill in their device, 
and others could want to use the lack of protection of the signal 
to spoof it and mislead mariners (Balduzzi et al., 2014a). The 
purpose of such an operation is to lead to mistaken decision 
from decision-makers. In this scope, the assessment of the fact 
to know whether or not the message is genuine is closely linked 
to the assessment of the quality of the received data, and to the 
eventual decision taken. 
 
3.2 Errors in AIS data 
Some data that AIS messages contain are entered manually at 
the system initialization (first use). A study of errors in those 
data is done by (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007). These errors are 
not intentional, they can be done by underestimating the 
importance of a proper fulfillment of the fields or by ignorance 
of the way the system works. 
 
For the unique identification number of the ship (also called 
MMSI number), 2% appear to be erroneous, as they follow 
impossible patterns (e.g. the first three numbers must represent 
the state of the ship) or characteristic numbers such as “0”, “1”, 
“999999999” or “1193046” which is supposed to be a default 
value of the field for a manufacturer.  
 
The type of the vessel is sometimes unclear. As 6% have no 
specified type, 3% are only described as “vessels”. The type can 
also be unclear for the user, as three identical boats used as 
service boats in a harbor were set with three different types 
(Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007). 
 
The name of the vessel is not properly filled in in 0.5% of the 
cases, as the name is either missing or too long: only 20 letters 
are allocated. Problems linked to geographical string names are 
developed in (Mazzola et al., 2013). 
 
For the physical characteristics of the vessel, between the 
available databases and the AIS messages, 47% of the vessels 
have discrepancies in length and 18% in beam. As for the draft, 
17% are “0” values and 14% are greater than the length of the 
vessel. 
 
In the dynamic data, errors are also widespread, as stated by 
(Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007): as for the position, 1% of vessels 
have a latitude greater than 90° or a longitude greater than 180°; 
at least 30% have an erroneous navigation status, e.g. say they 
are sailing while having a discordant speed; the destination is 
unclear in about half the cases. For instance, people using a 
vague name, a country, an abbreviation, a blank space…. 
 
 
On the website marinetraffic.com where a part of the 
international traffic is displayed, some cases of erroneous 
destination fields are shown. Six examples of such problematic 
data are: “ATLANTIC OCEAN”, where the destination is too 
vague, “HOME”, where the destination is perhaps true but not 
precise, “FOS SUR MER”, where the vessel clearly seems to 
come from this French city, and not go to it, “CH 16 FOR 
DESTINATION”, where the pilot asks for a communication in 
the maritime channel number 16, “TBA”, where the destination 
seems not to be known yet and “ANYWHERE BUT HERE”, 
where the pilot seems to joke without having bad intentions. 
 
Moreover, the system in itself can fail in transmitting 
information. Some transponders fail to reach all the 
requirements set by the ITU, and some ships display large blank 
areas. This missing data, as shown in (Lecornu et al., 2013), 
weaken the exploitation of AIS data by decreasing the 
reliability, but does not prevent it (as a meaningful statistical 
study is needed in order to judge the quality of data). 
 
3.3 Intentional falsification of AIS data 
Intentional falsification of the AIS signal is done by the crews 
on board the ships in order to modify or stop the message they 
send, in the very particular purpose of misleading the outside 
world. 
 
Identity theft also exists in the maritime domain (Windward, 
2014). It corresponds to the fact to navigate with a Maritime 
Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number which is not the real 
one, allocated and internationally recognized, but with the one 
of another vessel that actually exists somewhere else. Hundreds 
of ships are disguised this way. As the MMSI number changes, 
there is no way to assess a priori whether the vessel one is 
looking at is the right one. As stated in (gCaptain, 2012) and 
(The Maritime Executive, 2012), Iran used to falsify the MMSI 
number of some ships in order to trade with Syria, then under 
embargo. The Iranian ship Millionnaire took the identity of the 
Syrian ship Lady Rasha. At some time, there were two declared 
Lady Rasha, one in the Mediterranean Sea and one in the Indian 
Ocean. 
 
Destination masking is also sometimes a falsification 
(Windward, 2014). As sometimes it can be considered as an 
error, some other cases are about a voluntary deficiency of 
 information, done in order to sidestep the overview of the 
global ships flows. 
 
Disappearances are also a kind of falsification, as ships turn off 
their AIS transponder in order to hide some of their activities, 
such as fishing in an unauthorized area, or trade illegal goods 
(Katsilieris et al., 2013) with other ships or on coasts. 
 
3.4 Spoofing of AIS data by surroundings actors 
Spoofing of AIS data consists of an action made by an external 
actor in order to mislead the crew of the ship and the outside 
world on the behavior of the proper ship. 
 
One of the trickery is a false closest point of approach alert 
(Balduzzi et al., 2014b). An alert is triggered and the vessel is 
forced to change its heading and perhaps be guided to 
hazardous places in order to avoid a hypothetical boarding by a 
ghost vessel. 
 
Moreover, (Balduzzi et al., 2014b) implemented a spoofing 
program imitating a fake ship which is following a 
spatiotemporal path which made it spelling a word in the 
Mediterranean Sea. It was possible to see it displayed on the 
website marinetraffic.com. 
 
Another similar trickery is to simulate a search and rescue alert, 
forcing all the surrounding vessels to change their course. The 
creation of a false vessel, or of a false aid to navigation can also 
be done, in order to provide the vessel with erroneous data and 
influence its behavior. Availability disruptions (Balduzzi et al., 
2014b) are another kind of spoofing, preventing the vessel to 
transmit its data by several means. 
 
An example of spoofing is given in (Bhatti and Humphreys, 
2015), with a pirate who emits a GNSS false signal with a 
higher power than the genuine one, covering it. The system is 
then misled on its whereabouts, transmits a false AIS and forces 
the pilot or the autopilot to maneuver in order to return towards 
the cape he or it beliefs to be the right one, but actually the 
vessel moves away its real destination. 
 
Serious consequences of these spoofing events can be foreseen 
in case malicious actors, such as the terrorists, want to cause a 
catastrophic incident. Back in 2011, the port of Antwerp 
underwent an attack from a drug cartel (Le Marin, 2014a). 
Generally speaking, the merchant navy and the ports do not 
follow quickly enough the new cybercrime breakthroughs (Le 
Marin, 2014b). 
 
4. DATA QUALITY ASSESSMENT FOR DECISION 
MAKING 
4.1 Using quality of data for AIS integrity measurement 
 
As the purpose is to detect vessels that are undergoing attacks 
or that are emitting false messages on purpose, a means for the 
assessment of such vessels must be developed. As information 
comes from messages, it is possible to treat and analyze every 
message independently from the others, a group of messages as 
a whole, or a single message with respect to a group of 
messages. 
Data contained in AIS message are various, and the messages 
themselves are numerous. Such an analysis would bring a 
numerical value on a message, a group of messages or a 
message with respect to a group of messages. 
 
Inspired by the Information Theory developed by Shannon in 
(Shannon, 1948), a mathematical processing of data can be 
done in order to assess the usefulness of a message, its 
reliability and its integrity. 
 
The integrity of data is of major importance, and can be 
assessed for a single message (integrity of the information 
within), for a group of messages (integrity between the data 
between the messages) and for a message with respect to a 
group of messages. 
 
A coefficient for data integrity could then be computed, and 
with a specified threshold, detect the dubious messages on the 
basis of data quality, with many parameters taken into account, 
at several levels: internal to the system, a single message, a 
group of messages, or external to the system. Such a coefficient 
would be an indicator for data quality assessment. 
 
4.2 The quality of data in the case of AIS messages 
A minority of users actually falsifies their data, but they take a 
considerable importance in the monitoring of maritime 
awareness situation as they are the ones that profit from their 
falsification. Most of the data are sent in goodwill and in good 
intentions, but a certain amount is false, and sometimes, in case 
of spoofing, a vessel emits or receives messages that are not 
true, independently from the will of the crew. These three cases 
put the stress on the importance of the assessment of the quality 
of the data of such an unauthentic and unsecured system. 
 
The lack of reliability of the system could guide people into a 
lack of belief in the truthiness of data, and thus of the whole 
system. The blacklists can be weakened as undesirable ships 
hide some activities, and the global view of the world traffic is 
distorted, leading to wrong decisions. 
 
The purpose of such an analysis would also be to differentiate 
intentional falsifications from unintentional errors, by 
investigating the fields likely to receive erroneous or falsified 
data, and distinguish (in case of dubious data) the kind of pieces 
of information likely to be an error from the pieces of 
information likely to be a falsification. This can be addressed by 
a study on the field itself and its likeliness to be subject to a will 
of falsification. 
 
4.3 The people using AIS messages in their activities 
Fishermen use AIS in order to locate themselves, locate other 
ships in the area and know, thanks to their ECDIS (Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System), if they are in a legal 
fishing area. However, only ships longer than 20 meters are 
obliged to be equipped by AIS. 
 
Mariners, especially cargo transportation ship crews, use AIS 
for several purposes. Safety and security of the navigation are 
done, but also surveillance of surroundings vessels, at the time 
of arrival at a harbor can be important for the availability of an 
unloading spot. AIS can also be used to ask a question to 
another ship or declare oneself in danger.  
 
Law enforcement authorities use the AIS in several ways, taking 
it away from its initial purpose. The surveillance of fishing areas 
and of coastal ship behaviors is made, as well as the 
 surveillance of traffic separation schemes (TSS) set by the IMO. 
They look for typical behaviors that can help us to find out AIS 
manipulators. Methods to compute the theoretical position of a 
ship, in order to improve maritime awareness, when all AIS data 
are not available are developed (Vanneschi et al., 2015). 
 
Ship-owners, who want to follow the courses of their ships, 
thanks to the worldwide coverage this system has, can have a 
continuous global overview of their fleet.  
 
4.4 Quality elements taken into account in a quality 
assessment of AIS messages 
For the knowledge of the maritime situation and a better global 
maritime awareness, the quality of the data sent by the AIS must 
be improved. As this system is not reliable and used by many 
people for various purposes, the awareness of the users on the 
proper nature of the system shall be clear. 
 
The integrity of data must be investigated, as some information 
is clearly impossible (out framed GNSS coordinates for 
instance) or physically incompatible (two vessels with the same 
number at the same time, a speed that does not match with the 
type of the vessel). Such a determination of the reliability of 
information can be done using a scale of belief, disbelief and 
uncertainty based on a statistical study (Ceolin et al., 2013). 
 
The trust in a user will depend on the past behavior of this user, 
as the opinion about the source is a key part of trust (Hertzum et 
al., 2002). This part is mainly made by VTSs and harbors, with 
the blacklisting of suspicious vessels.  
 
There is a dependence of users on the system, and the 
credibility and trust of the users will depend on the ability of the 
system to display information that is true and verifiable. 
 
In this scope, the completeness of data is important, as well as 
its accuracy, in order to assess the confidence on the received 
and transmitted messages. This confidence should be acquired 
by the ascertainment of suspicious vessels, in order to consider 
their messages as subject to doubt; by the reduction of 
unintentional errors in the messages and by the detection of 
spoofing events. 
 
As this research is at its beginning, the quality components to 
use in particular cases and the way they will be used is yet to be 
defined, as well as the modeling and analysis of data quality 
parameters in AIS messages are yet to be elaborated. 
 
5. PRINCIPLES OF THE APPROACH 
5.1 Towards a real-time analysis of data quality 
The detection of errors, bad practices, suspicious or abnormal 
behaviors is done by the monitoring of specified areas, which 
depend on the purpose of the surveillance. In order to do that, 
the identification and a classification of the behaviors and of 
position reporting falsification techniques, as well as knowledge 
extraction methods, must be done. The detection is based on a 
rule-based engine (Riveiro and Falkman, 2009), (Ray et al., 
2013), based on recorded trajectories and a panel of typical 
suspicious behaviors, for instance. As some information in AIS 
data is dynamic, and the flow of data is continuous, it is 
important to process the messages on-fly, with two parallel 
processes: one which looks for specific patterns and defined 
spatiotemporal behaviors and another one which stores the 
recently acquired data in order to aggregate it to the database 
(Ray et al., 2015). A real-time analysis of the data could offer 
an immediate ascertainment of suspicious or attacked vessels 
and lead to a quicker response.  
 
In a global approach, a second step is needed, in order to have a 
system which could help for decision making. In order to move 
forward, a model of risks is needed. 
 
5.2 The modelling of risks 
The risks are to be modelled with ontologies, especially three of 
them: a trajectory ontology for a geometric definition of 
trajectories, a geographic ontology for the concepts which are 
specific to territory description and a domain ontology for the 
particular domain of AIS analysis. The analysis will be made in 
four steps, the first one being the technical and functional 
analysis of the system, in order to put a model on the studied 
system, the second one being the quantitative analysis, for a 
study of threat processes, the third one being the quantitative 
analysis, i.e. the analysis of the seriousness of the consequences 
of the various feared events, and the fourth one being the 
synthesis, in order to point out the most critical components of 
the system (Ray et al., 2015). 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces issues on AIS data quality, regarding the 
various problems of errors, falsification and spoofing of the 
messages. As the displayed information influences the point of 
view and analysis of the situation for decision-makers, the 
situation awareness of actors in a place as hazardous as sea is 
hampered. An assessment of the data quality would make the 
detection of AIS problems easier, enhance the situation 
awareness of decision makers and improve safety and security at 
sea. 
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